Energy Policy in Germany
Energiafoorumi ry
Energy Forum of Finland – FINNWEC
Press Release
May 8, 2002
Dr. Gert Maichel, Executive Vice President of RWE AG
President and CEO of
RWE Power AG
Energy Policy in Germany
The energy policy of the EU member states is basically determined by the
general European conditions. At the center is the liberalization of the European
domestic market for electric power and gas as well as the climate-policy
commitments of the individual member states. The liberalization of the
electricity markets has led to considerable competitive distortions because of
the different market openings, in addition to dramatic increases in efficiency
and reductions of prices. More than 100 million customers in Europe still cannot
freely choose their supplier. On the other hand, the monopoly companies thus
protected use their domestic advantage to aggressively expand into the markets
already liberalized. A rapid harmonization of the boundary conditions in Europe
is therefore of the utmost importance.
Contrary to the Commission's report on implementing the domestic market,
liberalization in Germany has been very successful. The Commission criticizes,
among other issues, excessive electricity prices, inadequate unbundling and
excessive system usage fees. Along with Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
Austria, Germany is one of the five EU countries where the electricity markets
are 100% liberalized. The electricity prices have fallen dramatically by up to
50% for industrial customers and by about 25% for private customers. But the
liberalization profits of nearly € 7.5 billion were nearly completely offset by
state-related special costs amounting to over € 6~billion. The EU Commission's
account is also not factually correct in view of the system usage fees, which
are rather low by international comparison.
I am firmly convinced that the complete liberalization was and is the sole
correct solution in view of the customers and the overall economic advantages.
Since 1998, the German energy companies have consistently met the challenge of
competition and are now competitive on the international level, too.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the German political sector. It quite
willingly accepts the severe disadvantages for competition-oriented national
energy companies caused by the competitive distortions due to the different
market openings in Europe. From the perspective of the German energy industry,
it is therefore essential that these competitive distortions be rectified as
soon as possible _ that is, by 2005 at the latest.
Our customers and the German industry as a whole also suffer considerable
disadvantages from the aforementioned unilateral special costs, however.
Overall, we have a patchwork of separate, populist decisions. The most
far-reaching of these decisions was beyond doubt the decision on the future role
of nuclear energy.
The new Atomic Law went into effect on April 27. It is based largely on the
agreement reached by the German energy utilities and the Federal Government in
June 2001.
This agreement ensures that we as a company can operate our power stations
with the necessary waste disposal, and thus allows us to have the necessary
planning reliability for the coming years. The price of this assurance – the
limitation of the kilowatt-hours to be generated at the nuclear power plants to
a total of nearly 2,600 TWh – was high. The companies have thus gone to the
limit of what they can reasonably ask of their employees and shareholders.
Here I would like again to emphasize the companies' steadfast conviction that
the peaceful use of nuclear energy is economically and ecologically practical as
well as safe and fully acceptable morally. That's why the companies have refused
to approve the prohibition on the construction of new nuclear plants anchored in
the Atomic Law amendment either in the agreement or at any other place.
Unfortunately, given the current political climate in Germany, there was no
alternative to an agreement with the Federal Government .
Politicians were relatively quick to decide on phasing out nuclear energy in
our country. Nevertheless, the consequences of implementing this phase-out will
be determining our energy policy in many respects for years to come and
constricting our maneuvering freedom. We recognize more and more that the role
of nuclear energy cannot be isolated from an integral overall energy policy
concept. This holds true not only given the ecological challenges of the future,
such as those concerning climate protection, but also in view of future supply
security and the competitiveness of our energy supplies.
When I think of the goals of energy policy, then it quickly becomes clear
again why, despite the nuclear energy compromise, we have always maintained that
we have to keep the nuclear energy option open for future generations. This is
true economically, ecologically and with respect to supply security.
Economically considered, nuclear energy is a competitive energy source.
Anyone who keeps denying this is not aware that nuclear energy has the lowest
generation costs in the base load range. In view of the drastic drop in
electricity prices – especially in the industrial customer segment – in Germany
and in Europe, this is a competitive factor not to be underestimated.
Ecologically considered, Germans are sacrificing a climate-friendly as well as
competitive energy supply on the political altar. The demand for a 40% reduction
of CO2 emissions relative to 1990 is itself more than difficult even without the
phase-out of nuclear energy already decided on. How the Federal Government's
ambitious goals in climate protection fit together with the simultaneous
phase-out of nuclear energy is a mystery. To make the problem clear, consider
this one figure: last year alone, power generation from nuclear plants in
Germany allowed us to avoid the emission of approximately 180 million tons of
CO2. That's more than the emissions caused by all road transportation vehicles
in Germany. Realistic proposals on how this enormous volume of CO2 alone can be
avoided if we give up on nuclear energy are nowhere to be seen. Even further
regulatory interventions would not take us to this goal. This is true in
particular for the draft of a directive on introducing a European-wide system on
trading emission rights, submitted last October by the EU Commission. We firmly
reject this proposal not because we consider the basic idea of emission trading
a bad instrument, but because the Commission's draft has been poorly crafted and
has nothing to do with the flexible tools agreed on in Kyoto.
Also for reasons of supply security we must very quickly define the general
conditions in Germany for the next few decades. The phase-out of nuclear energy
was accomplished very fast on paper. But we could just as fast fall into a
supply gap with open eyes. In the next 20 years, power station capacities of the
order of 200,000 MW will have to be replaced in Europe for purely age reasons.
If we accept the assumptions of the EU Green Book, which predicts increasing
power consumption, then we must expect an additional new construction of plants
generating 200.000 MW. If we consider the usual administrative and constructive
planning periods of eight to ten years, we don't have much time to make the
decisions on investment for the future generations of power stations. This
decision-making presupposes a level of planning reliability in energy policy
that I cannot find at present.
Today German companies are still competitive even by international standards.
We want to secure and expand this position in the long term. To this end, we
urgently need a non-ideological overall concept in Germany, which considers
energy policy goals in a balanced and nondiscriminatory manner, and does not
lose sight of the European aspects. Unfortunately, such an overall concept for
energy policy seems not to be immanent for the foreseeable future.
Against this background, the German path is in no way exemplary for other EU
countries, and I'm sure that it will not be a model on the international level.
For a future-oriented energy policy, we must not flirt with short-term political
majorities, but rather act according to responsible and technically informed
decisions. That's what reason demands – economically, ecologically and for the
sake of supply security.
Very informative and open discussions with leading representatives of the
Finnish energy industry have shown me that Finland is more than a step ahead of
Germany in this regard. I am very impressed with the way in which you are
conducting this debate on the future of supply structures for the 21st century,
an issue that is essential for any national economy. At the same time, I am
confident that you will find the right answer for Finland.
Dr. jur. Dipl. Ing. agr. Gert Maichel
Executive Vice President of RWE
AG
President and CEO of RWE Power AG
Biography |
|
February 4, 1949 | born in Timmendorfer Strand |
June 1968 | School-leaving examination permitting university matriculation
(Abitur) |
1970 | Started to study agricultural economics |
1974 | Degree: graduated agricultural engineer (Dipl.-Ing. agr.) |
1974 to 1977 | Studied law |
1977 to 1979 | Practical judicial training at the Intermediate Court of Appeal (OLG)
in Lüneburg |
1977 to 1980 | Assistant at the faculty of law, Göttingen |
1981 to 1984 | BASF Aktiengesellschaft Central department of Law |
1982 | Doctor's degree in Göttingen |
1984 to 1989 | MOBIL OIL, Hamburg Head of the department of Law |
1989 to 1990 | Wintershall AG/ Kali und Salz AG, Head of the division of Law |
1990 to 1993 | Wintershall AG Representative Director Head of the Natural Gas
division |
1993 to 1998 | Spokesman of the Managing Board of WINGAS GmbH, Kassel Managing
Director of Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus GmbH, Berlin |
1998 | BASF Aktiengesellschaft Department Manager and head of the
business unit of Ultraplastics |
January 1999 to 2000 | President and CEO of VEW Aktiengesellschaft, Dortmund |
October 2000 | Member of Executive Board of RWE AG, President and CEO of RWE
Power AG |